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Limited Partners' Derivative Suits
Under The Revised Uniform Limited
Partnership Act
Edwin W. Hecker, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The long-existing need for a form of business association that
permits an investor to contribute capital and receive a share of the
profits while remaining free from both management responsibility
and personal liability in excess of the amount invested' is being met
in the United States principally by two forms of business organiza-
tion-the corporation and the limited partnership. Limited partner-
ships, which can be traced back to the commenda of the middle
ages,' first received statutory recognition in this country in New
York in 1822.1 Because of the strict requirements contained in early
statutes, and their strict construction by the courts,4 limited part-
nerships did not come of age until the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act was promulgated in 1916 by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws.5 Since that time the 1916 Act
has been adopted in forty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and
the Virgin Islands.'
The fact that limited partnerships, unlike corporations, are not
usually treated as separate legal entities for federal income tax pur-
poses7 and the advent of sophisticated tax shelter planning over the
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1. A. BROMBERO, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP § 26, at 143 (1968).
2. Id.
3. 1822 N.Y. LAws, ch. 244.
4. Lewis, The Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 65 U. PA. L. REv. 715, 720-23 (1917).
5. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT, 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 561 (originally drafted in
1916) [hereinafter cited as 1916 Act].
6. 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 93 (Supp. 1979). Louisiana, because of its legal heritage, has
not adopted the 1916 Act but recognizes the civil law equivalent of the limited partnership,
the partnership in commendam. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 2839-2851 (West 1952 & Supp.
1978).
7. I.R.C. §§ 701-702. If a limited partnership has too many corporate characteristics,
however, it may be treated as a corporation for tax purposes. For discussions of the problem
of tax classification of limited partnerships, see 1 Z. CAvrrCH, BusINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 9.03
(1978); Note, Tax Classification of Limited Partnerships, 90 HARv. L. REv. 745 (1977); Note,
Tax Classification of Limited Partnerships: The IRS Bombards the Tax Shelters, 52
N.Y.U.L. REv. 408 (1977).
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past two decades have caused a tremendous growth in the number,
size, and economic importance of limited partnerships. Previously,
most limited partnerships were enterprises with relatively few lim-
ited partners who often were associated closely with the general
partner or partners either personally, professionally, or geographi-
cally. Because of the tax benefits and limited liability available to
members of the limited partnership, this pattern has changed. Dur-
ing the early 1970s much of the risk capital invested in speculative
fields such as real estate, oil and gas, timber, equipment leasing,
motion pictures, and cattle was channeled through limited partner-
ships, with interests marketed publicly to thousands of passive
investors throughout the country.8 While the Tax Reform Act of
1976' and the Revenue Act of 197810 limited some of the special tax
benefits previously available in these fields of investment, one of the
largest-real estate syndications-emerged relatively unscathed.",
As is the case with publicly held corporations, ownership is
separated from control in the modem limited partnership. Unlike
corporations, however, this separation results not only from the dis-
persion of ownership among thousands of investors, but also from
the theoretical nature of a limited partnership. By definition, a
limited partner is a passive investor. This requirement is enforced
by section 7 of the 1916 Act, which imposes unlimited liability as
the price for participation in control.12 This statutory disjunction of
ownership and control is an integral part of what was thought to be
a delicate balance achieved by the 1916 Act. The general partners
could secure additional funds for the business yet remain firmly in
control, while the limited partners could be sure of the active inter-
est and care of the general partners by reason of the latter's unlim-
ited personal liability for obligations of the business.'3 As limited
partnerships evolved, small enterprises with close personal relation-
ships among the members became large, sophisticated concerns
with hundreds of members, and this balance has broken down.
Moreover, the necessarily passive nature of the limited partners'
role has invited mismanagement and self-dealing by general part-
ners. 4
8. See Roulac, Resolution of Limited Partnership Disputes: Practical and Procedural
Problems, 10 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 276, 279-80 (1975); Glasser, Gimme Shelter: Reform
of Real Estate Tax Shelters, 7 U. MICH. J.L. RmF. 267, 268 (1974).
9. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (codified in 26 U.S.C.).
10. Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
11. See I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D); Wiesner, Tax Shelters-A Survey of the Impact of the
Tax Reform Act of 1976, 33 TAX L. REv. 5, 49-69 (1977) (predating the Revenue Act of 1978).
12. 1916 Act § 7. Section 9 specifically vests control in the general partners. Id. § 9.
13. Lewis, supra note 4, at 717.
14. See, e.g., Executive Hotel Assocs. v. Elm Hotel Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 354,245 N.Y.S.2d
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In the corporate context such conduct by directors or officers,
if it resulted in harm to the corporation, properly would be the
subject of a shareholders' derivative suit. Such a suit is a procedural
device permitting one or more shareholders to prosecute a claim on
behalf of the corporation if the directors are unwilling or unable to
do so, a not uncommon occurrence if the directors, themselves, are
the potential defendants. The existence of a similar procedural de-
vice in the limited partnership context is less widely recognized. It
has been developing intermittently in the courts of several states
but has been codified in only two. 5
In 1976 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws promulgated a revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act
"intended to modernize the prior uniform law while retaining the
special character of limited partnerships as compared with corpora-
tions."' 6 The 1976 Act addresses the problem of divorce of ownership
from control in two principal ways, one substantive and one proce-
dural. First, although it continues the prohibition on taking part in
control of the business, 7 it provides that limited partners may be
given and may exercise voting rights with respect to certain funda-
mentally important matters, including the removal of a general
partner, without being deemed to be participating in control.)" Sec-
ond, it expressly recognizes the right of a limited partner to institute
929 (Civ. Ct.), aff'd mem., 43 Misc. 2d 153, 250 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
15. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1732 (1974); N.Y. PARTNERSHI'LAW §§ 115-ato-c (McKin-
ney Supp. 1978-1979).
16. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT, Prefatory Note, 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 117
(Supp. 1979) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Act].
17. Id. § 303(a).
18. The matters with respect to which limited partners may possess voting rights are:
(1) dissolution and winding up of the partnership; (2) disposition of all or substantially all of
the partnership assets other than in the ordinary course of business; (3) incurrence of indebt-
edness by the partnership other than in the ordinary course of business; (4) change in the
nature of the business; and (5) removal of a general partner. Id. § 303(b)(5). The securities
administrators of several states, concerned about the potential for abuse by general partners,
have begun to require that limited partner interests offered for sale in their states carry voting
rights that essentially correspond to those enumerated in section 303(b)(5). E.g., CENTRAL
SEcURmEs ADMINISTRATORS CouNciL, GUIDELINES FOR THE REGISTRATION OF COMMODITY POOL
PROGRAMS § V B (January 24, 1978), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 4877; NORTH AMERICAN
SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR THE REGISTRATION OF OIL AND GAS
PROGRAMS § VIII F (September 22, 1976, amended, October 12, 1977), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) 4589; MIDWEST SEcURTnImS COMMISSIONERS AssocATION, STATEMENT OF PoICY RE-
GARDING REAL ESTATE PROGRAMS § VII B (February 28, 1973, amended, February 26, 1974,
amended, July 22, 1975), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 4821. It should be noted that § 302 of
the 1976 Act permits limited partners to be given voting rights on any matter or matters, but
to the extent that such voting rights exceed those enumerated in § 303(b)(5) possession or
exercise may constitute participation in control. 1976 Act § 302 & Comment.
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a derivative action on behalf of the partnership in certain circum-
stances. "
The purpose of this Article is to examine the provisions of the
1976 Act that authorize limited partners' derivative suits. This ex-
amination necessarily must begin by tracing the development of
derivative suits under the 1916 Act. With this background estab-
lished the Article will proceed to analyze the relevant provisions of
the 1976 Act.
II. DERIVATIVE SUITS UNDER THE 1916 AcT
As previously noted, the virtually complete operating control
given to general partners by the 1916 Act, together with the evolu-
tion of limited partnerships from small, personalized concerns to
large, impersonal enterprises with hundreds of limited partners, has
created a situation rife with opportunities for self-dealing and other
misconduct by general partners. Executive Hotel Associates v. Elm
Hotel Corp."0 unfortunately may not be an altogether atypical ex-
ample. Executive was a limited partnership with 168 limited part-
ners. Its only asset was a long-term lease on a hotel building, for
which it had paid $400,000. Elm was the corporate tenant of the
building under a sublease with Executive. The same individual was
both the president and major shareholder of Elm and the sole gen-
eral partner of Executive. Elm defaulted on its obligation to pay
rent, and when some of the limited partners complained, this indi-
vidual, acting as general partner of Executive, released Elm from
the obligation to pay over $51,000 in rental arrearages. He also mo-
dified the sublease by substantially reducing future rent and releas-
ing certain property deposited with Executive as security. He subse-
quently created a new corporation, of which he was president and
sole shareholder, and, again acting as general partner of Executive,
assigned the underlying leasehold to this new corporation. "At this
point," said the court, "the property which launched the limited
19. 1976 Act §§ 1001-1004. There currently is some question whether, under the provi-
sions of the 1916 Act, a limited partner's institution of a derivative action constitutes partici-
pation in control of the business in violation of § 7. See text accompanying notes 66-78 infra.
While the 1976 Act does not address this issue with the specificity that some might desire, a
fair construction of the Act requires the conclusion that institution of such a suit is not
participation in control. In addition to the reasons supporting such a conclusion under the
1916 Act, see id., § 303(a) of the 1976 Act expressly provides: "[A] limited partner is not
liable for the obligations of a limited partnership unless he is also a general partner or, in
addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in the
control of the business." Since the 1976 Act itself, unlike the 1916 Act, gives a limited partner
the right to sue derivatively, filing suit merely would be "the exercise of his rights and powers
as a limited partner."
20. 41 Misc. 2d 354, 245 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Civ. Ct.), aff'd mem., 43 Misc. 2d 153, 250
N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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partnership was completely gone-and indeed Executive Hotel As-
sociates was bare and denuded of the single asset for which it paid
$400,000 and which gave it birth.""
It is clear that the fiduciary duties applicable to partners in a
general partnership also apply at least to the general partners of a
limited partnership." It is equally clear that conduct such as that
just described is a breach of those duties. The problem, of course,
is enforcement. Since the general partners control the business and
ordinarily will be disinclined to institute litigation against them-
selves, those they control, or those with whom they are in collusion,
the question becomes one of what, if anything, the limited partners
can do. The following discussion will describe various courts' at-
tempts to deal with this problem within the framework of the 1916
Act.
A. Limited Partnership as an Entity
The very essence of a derivative suit is the conscription and
assertion by one person of a cause of action technically belonging
to another person. Therefore, recognition of the possibility of a de-
rivative suit in the limited partnership context requires the conclu-
sion that, for some purposes at least, such partnerships are juridical
entities separate and distinct from their members.
The committee drafting the Uniform Partnership Act had to
decide whether to adhere to the common-law view of a partnership
as a mere aggregation of individuals or to adopt the theory that a
partnership is a separate entity similar to a corporation. They chose
the former, and the Uniform Partnership Act, now the governing law
in most jurisdictions,2 proceeds on that basis.24 The same commit-
tee drafted the 1916 Actz with the result that limited as well as
general partnerships usually are analyzed in terms of the aggregate
theory. 6 This predisposition has led some courts to conclude that it
is theoretically impossible for a limited partner to maintain a deriv-
ative action on behalf of the partnership because there is no entity
for the plaintiff-partner to represent.Y
21. 41 Misc. 2d at 358, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 932.
22. E.g., Riviera Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 547, 223 N.E.2d 876, 879,
277 N.Y.S.2d 386, 392 (1966); Roulac, supra note 8, at 287-91.
23. See 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 1 (Supp. 1979).
24. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, § 6(1) (1914).
25. Lewis, supra note 4, at 715.
26. 1916 Act §§ 1, 29; see Donroy, Ltd. v. United States, 301 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1962);
Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer, 52 Cal. App. 3d 118, 125 Cal. Rptr. 59 (Ct. App. 1975).
27. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 232 F. Supp. 965, 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1964),
reu'd, 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965); see Millard v. Newmark & Co., 24 A.D. 2d 333, 338, 266
N.Y.S.2d 254, 260 (1966).
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The conclusion is not a necessary one. It is based on an "all or
nothing" analysis that fails to recognize that even under the Uni-
form Partnership Act and the 1916 Act partnerships are treated as
entities for some purposes. For example, title to real property may
be acquired in the partnership name; 2s a distinction is made be-
tween property belonging to the partnership and a partner's interest
in the partnership; 9 the death of a limited partner does not dissolve
a limited partnership; 30 and the death of a general partner of a
limited partnership will not work even a technical dissolution if the
remaining general partners rightfully continue the business.
3'
The possibility that a limited partnership could be treated as
an aggregate of individuals for some purposes but as an entity for
procedural purposes formed the basis for the holding of the New
York Court of Appeals in Ruzicka v. Rager32 that, in a suit brought
on behalf of the partnership, neither general nor limited partners
were subject to counterclaims founded on personal transactions.
While recognizing that partnerships normally are not considered to
be entities, the court stated as follows:
It is to be remembered that we are here concerned with a limited partnership.
There is good reason for regarding such a partnership as a distinct entity for
the purposes of pleading. Limited partnerships were unknown to the common
law and, like corporations, are "creature[s] of statute". Statutes permitting
limited partnerships are intended to encourage investment in business enter-
prise by affording to a limited partner a position analogous to that of a corpo-
rate shareholder."
Although that court did not have to determine the viability of a
limited partner's derivative suit, its analysis clearly laid the ground-
work for future decisions by emphasizing that for some purposes
limited partnerships and limited partners are more similar to corpo-
rations and shareholders than to general partnerships and general
partners. Subsequent decisions that sought to formulate effective
procedures for the protection of limited partners have built on this
analysis and consequently have not considered the aggregate theory
28. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr § 8(3).
29. Id. §§ 25-26; 1916 Act § 18.
30. 1916 Act § 21.
31. Id. § 20.
32. 305 N.Y. 191, 111 N.E.2d 878 (1953).
33. Id. at 197-98, 111 N.E.2d at 881 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
34. See Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965); Riviera
Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 223 N.E.2d 876, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1966); Lichty-
ger v. Franchard Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 528, 538-39, 223 N.E.2d 869, 875, 277 N.Y.S.2d 377, 385-
86 (1966) (Burke, J., concurring); Millard v. Newmark & Co., 24 A.D. 2d 333, 342-43, 266
N.Y.S.2d 254, 265 (1966) (Rabin, J., dissenting in part); Comment, Standing of Limited
Partners to Sue Derivatively, 65 COLUM. L. Rsv. 1463, 1481-84 (1965).
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to be an insurmountable obstacle .3 The finding of an entity, how-
ever, was only the first step toward resolution of the ultimate ques-
tion.
B. Lack of Statutory Authority
The only judicial remedies that the 1916 Act specifically grants
to limited partners are the right to a formal accounting and the right
to seek judicial dissolution of the partnership.3 5 Some courts, adopt-
ing a conservative attitude toward the judicial function, have
viewed these remedies as exclusive, thus precluding recognition of
a derivative suit for either damages or equitable relief.8 Such a view
demonstrates not only conservatism but a myopic sense of history.
Shareholders' derivative suits, now a matter widely regulated by
statute or court rule, had their origin in courts of equity without the
aid of empowering legislation.37 The early case of Foss v. Harbottle, 
3
1
while holding that a derivative suit could not be maintained on the
facts there presented, summarized the rationale for allowing such
suits under some circumstances as follows:
If a case should arise of injury to a corporation by some of its members, for
which no adequate remedy remained, except that of a suit by individual corpo-
rators in their private characters, and asking in such character the protection
of those rights to which in their corporate character they were entitled, I cannot
but think that ... the claims of justice would be found superior to any diffi-
culties arising out of technical rules respecting the mode in which corporations
are required to sue.3
As the rationale stated in Foss is dependent on the inadequacy
of other remedies, it becomes necessary to examine the adequacy of
the limited partners' remedies of dissolution and accounting. Al-
though a breach of fiduciary duty may give a limited partner a cause
of action for judicial dissolution,"0 this remedy often will be akin to
throwing out the baby with the bath water. It usually will bring an
end to the enterprise, and may force a sacrifice of going concern
value. It also does not provide a method for redress of past injuries.
For these reasons a limited partner who wishes to have the business
continued will rarely find judicial dissolution a satisfactory remedy,
and it should not bar a derivative suit in an appropriate situation.41
35. 1916 Act § 10(1)(b), (c).
36. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 232 F. Supp. 965, 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1964),
rev'd, 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965); Millard v. Newmark & Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 333, 336-37,
266 N.Y.S.2d 254, 258-59 (1966).
37. Comment, supra note 34, at 1467-70.
38. 2 Hare 461, 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (Ch. 1843).
39. Id. at 492, 67 Eng. Rep. at 203.
40. 1916 Act §§ 10(1)(c), 29; UNmFoRm PARTNxRsns AcT § 32(1)(c), (d).
41. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 299 (2d Cir. 1965); Comment,
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An accounting proceeding, the traditional partnership remedy
for breaches of fiduciary duty, 2 also will be inadequate in many
cases. Its major legal inadequacy derives from the fact that it is
founded on the existence of a fiduciary duty and therefore normally
may not be maintained against persons who are not partners but
into whose hands partnership assets may have fallen.43 Its major
practical inadequacy stems from the inability of the moving limited
partner to recover his or her counsel fees.44 In the context of a mod-
em limited partnership, in which the stake of each individual lim-
ited partner often will be relatively small in comparison to potential
litigation expenses, this inability may mean that wrongs to the part-
nership perpetrated by the general partners or those with whom
they are in collusion will go uncompensated unless a limited partner
is allowed to proceed derivatively. Faced with such a choice, a num-
ber of courts have had no difficulty in permitting a derivative suit
unaided by specific statutory authority. 45
Searching for a theoretical basis for such an action, these courts
have analogized the position of a limited partner to that of a trust
beneficiary and to that of a corporate shareholder. Generally, as a
matter of trust law, if a third party tortiously damages the trust
property or breaches a contract made with the trustee on behalf of
the trust, the right to enforce any resulting cause of action resides
exclusively with the trustee." If the trustee refuses to enforce the
cause of action and such refusal is not improper, no legal or equita-
ble relief is available to the beneficiaries.47 If, however, such refusal
is improper, it will constitute a breach of trust, and the beneficiaries
may maintain a suit in equity against the trustee to compel him or
her to assert the underlying cause of action against the third party."
supra note 34, at 1480.
42. 1916 Act §§ 10(1)(b), 29; UNwoRm PARTNFsmP Acr § 21(1); Alpert v. Haimes, 64
Misc. 2d 608, 315 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
43. A. BROMBERG, supra note 1, § 26, at 149; Comment, supra note 34, at 1480.
44. Millard v. Newmark & Co., 24 A.D. 2d 333, 336, 266 N.Y.S.2d 254, 258 (1966).
45. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965); Klebanow v.
Funston, 35 F.R.D. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Riviera Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540,
223 N.E.3d 876, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1966); Executive Hotel Assocs. v. Elm Hotel Corp., 41
Misc. 2d 354, 245 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Civ. Ct.), aff'd mem., 43 Misc. 2d 153, 250 N.Y.S.2d 351
(Sup. Ct. 1964); cf. Kobernick v. Shaw, 70 Cal. App. 3d 914, 139 Cal. Rptr. 188 (Ct. App.
1977) (limited partners permitted to maintain cross-complaint in suit against partnership);
Linder v. Vogue Invs., Inc., 239 Cal. App. 2d 338, 48 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966)
(limited partners permitted to intervene to defend suit against partnership); McCully v.
Radack, 27 Md. App. 350, 340 A.2d 374 (Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (limited partners permitted to
intervene in proceeding to foreclose deed of trust executed by partnership).
46. 4 A. Scour, THE LAw OF TRUSTS § 282 (3d ed. 1967).




Originally, the beneficiaries could do no more than this, but in order
to avoid the necessity of two suits (one by the beneficiaries against
the trustee and a second by the trustee against the third party)
modern trust law permits the beneficiaries to join the third party
in the suit against the trustee and to assert the underlying cause of
action on their own behalf.4' Since the analogy of a shareholder to a
trust beneficiary formed the theoretical underpinnings of the early
shareholders' derivative suit decisions," it is not surprising to find
courts returning to this familiar ground when faced with similar
questions concerning limited partners' rights."
The shareholder analogy seems equally compelling. Originating
with Ruzicka v. Rager,52 it received perhaps its best exposition by
Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit in Klebanow v. New
York Product Exchange:"
[I]n the main, a limited partner is more like a shareholder, often expecting a
share of the profits, subordinated to general creditors, having some control over
direction of the enterprise by his veto on the admission of new partners, and
able to examine books. . . .That the limited partner is immune to personal
liability for partnership debts save for his original investment, is not thought
to be an "owner" of partnership property, and does not manage the business
may distinguish him from general partners but strengthens his resemblance
to the stockholder; and even as to his preference in dissolution, he resembles
the preferred stockholder."
This analysis seems correct. A limited partner is an equity partici-
pant in an enterprise controlled by others.5 Such enterprises most
commonly are organized either as corporations or as limited part-
nerships. If, for extraneous reasons, the latter form of association is
adopted, the procedural rights of its passive investors, when faced
with abuse by those in control, should be no less as limited partners
than as shareholders.
C. Section 26
Another major stumbling block to limited partners' derivative
suits under the 1916 Act is section 26, which provides: "A contribu-
49. Id.
50. Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 980, 986-88 (1957).
51. Decisions relying on the trust beneficiary analogy in support of a limited partner's
right to sue derivatively include the following: Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344
F.2d 294, 297-98 (2d Cir. 1965); Klebanow v. Funston, 35 F.R.D. 518, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
Riviera Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 547-48, 223 N.E.2d 876, 879-80, 277
N.Y.S.2d 386, 392 (1966).
52. 305 N.Y. 191, 111 N.E.2d 878 (1953).
53. 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965).
54. Id. at 297.
55. 1916 Act § 1, Comment; 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1174, 1177-78 (1965).
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tor, unless he is a general partner, is not a proper party to proceed-
ings by or against a partnership, except where the object is to en-
force a limited partner's right against or liability to the partner-
ship. 56 A derivative suit brought by a limited partner would seem
to fall within the literal wording of the section. The limited partner
would be a party, the plaintiff; the proceedings would be against the
partnership, as nominal defendant; and the object would not be to
enforce the limited partner's personal right against the partnership,
but rather to enforce the partnership's right against the general
partners or third parties.57 Thus, even assuming that a limited part-
nership is an entity on whose behalf a derivative suit properly could
be brought, section 26 could be read as an absolute prohibition of
such actions.58 Read in this manner, section 26 would be perceived
as reinforcing the legislative balance between unlimited liability
and control on the part of general partners and limited liability
and passivity on the part of limited partners.
5
1
On the other hand, section 26 can be given meaning and the
legislative balance can be preserved on the basis of a narrower read-
ing. First, section 26 could be viewed in part simply as a procedural
restatement of a limited partner's limited liability." Thus, unless a
limited partner has violated some other liability-producing sec-
tion,6" he or she is not a proper party to proceedings against the
partnership. 2 With respect to proceedings instituted by the partner-
ship, section 26 simply may mean that limited partners need not
join as plaintiffs,P3 and in fact that they may not join if the general
56. 1916 Act § 26.
57. By relying on the trust beneficiary analogy it might be argued that a limited part-
ner's derivative suit is not prohibited even by the literal language of § 26. That is, the essence
of the suit is the enforcement of the limited partner's right to have the partnership properly
managed. The primary defendants are the general partners who improperly have refused to
institute litigation on the underlying cause of action, whether or not they also are the ultimate
wrongdoers. The primary relief sought is an order compelling the assertion of such cause of
action, and the mere fact that third parties may be joined as defendants to avoid the necessity
of two suits does not change the fact that the limited partner is asserting what is essentially
a personal right. The suit, therefore, should be covered by the express exception in § 26. See
Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer, 52 Cal. App. 3d 118, 128, 125 Cal. Rptr. 59, 67 (Ct. App. 1975).
58. Millard v. Newmark & Co., 24 A.D. 2d 333, 336, 266 N.Y.S.2d 254, 259 (1966);
Lieberman v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Wash. 2d 922, 927, 385 P.2d 53, 56 (1963).
59. See Millard v. Newmark & Co., 24 A.D. 2d 333, 337, 266 N.Y.S.2d 254, 260 (1966).
60. 1916 Act § 1: "The limited partners as such shall not be bound by the obligations
of the partnership."
61. E.g., id. §§ 5, 6, 7, 15, 16, 17.
62. Vulcan Furniture Mfg. Corp. v. Vaughn, 168 So. 2d 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964);
see Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 298(2d Cir. 1965); Linder v. Vogue
Invs., Inc., 239 Cal. App. 2d 338, 340-41, 48 Cal. Rptr. 633, 635 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
63. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 298 (2d Cir. 1965); Oil & Gas
Ventures, Inc. v. Cheyenne Oil Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 596, 601-02, 202 A.2d 282, 285 (ch.), affl'd,
42 Del. Ch. 100, 204 A.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Comment, supra note 34, at 1475.
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partners are pursuing the litigation actively." If the general partners
have refused to pursue the cause of action, and if such refusal is
wrongful, the legislative balance already will have broken down, and
section 26 need not be construed as an absolute bar to a suit insti-
tuted by one or more limited partners. In such a case, however, the
legislative policy underlying the 1916 Act would seem to require at
least that the limited partners' standing be dependent upon a dem-




The final issue arising in decisions under the 1916 Act is
whether a limited partner's institution of suit on behalf of the part-
nership constitutes participation in control of the business within
the meaning of section 7. That section provides: "A limited partner
shall not become liable as a general partner unless, in addition to
the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes
part in the control of the business." 6 Only a few cases specifically
address this question, and none can be regarded as conclusive. For
example, one opinion states, without analysis, that merely bringing
suit violates section 7;67 another case assumes the same result;68 and
a third expressly reserves decision on the issue.6"
The resolution of this issue requires an analysis of section 7. In
general, there is a split of authority regarding whether section 7
impliedly embodies a reliance element. That is, some courts and
commentators believe that a limited partner who participates in
control of the business should only incur personal liability if the
activity reasonably could be construed by creditors as indicative of
general rather than limited partner status. 0 Others read section 7
64. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 298 (2d Cir. 1965); Riviera
Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 547, 223 N.E.2d 876, 879, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386, 391
(1966); Comment, supra note 34, at 1475; 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1174, 1176 (1965).
65. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 299 (2d Cir. 1965); McCully
v. Radack, 27 Md. App. 350, 360, 340 A.2d 374, 380 (Ct. Spec. App. 1975).
66. 1916 Act § 7.
67. Executive Hotel Assocs. v. Elm Hotel Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 354, 358-59, 245 N.Y.S.2d
929, 933 (Civ. Ct.), aff'd mem., 43 Misc. 2d 153, 250 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
68. Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer, 52 Cal. App. 3d 118, 128, 125 Cal. Rptr. 59, 66 (Ct. App.
1975).
69. McCully v. Radack, 27 Md. App. 350, 360, 340 A.2d 374, 380 (Ct. Spec. App. 1975).
70. Western Camps, Inc. v. Riverway Ranch Enterprises, 70 Cal. App. 3d 714, 728-30,
138 Cal. Rptr. 918, 926-27 (Ct. App. 1977); Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 517 S.W.2d 420,
425 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974), rev'd, 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975); Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union
Properties, Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 400, 405-06, 562 P.2d 244, 247 (1977), affrg 14 Wash. App. 634,
641, 544 P.2d 781, 785 (1975); Rathke v. Griffith, 36 Wash. 2d 394, 407-08, 218 P.2d 757, 764
(1950); Feld, The "Control" Test for Limited Partnerships, 82 HAxv. L. Rav. 1471, 1479-80
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literally, refusing to imply an element of deception or reliance. They
therefore hold that a limited partner who participates in control will
become liable as a general partner regardless of whether the conduct
could have been misleading to outsiders.7 This view can be sup-
ported on either of two bases. First, section 7 may be considered a
sanction designed to protect the management prerogatives of the
general partners from unwarranted interference by limited part-
ners.72 Alternatively, section 7 may be founded on the notion that a
limited partner who participates in control is equally responsible
with the general partners for loss or dissipation of the firm's assets.
Thus, in case of insolvency of the firm (the principal time that
personal liability is important), a limited partner who shares control
ought to share liability to creditors.
3
Under any interpretation, institution of a derivative suit by a
limited partner should not be held to constitute participation in
control. It is hard to imagine how this conduct, which presumably
would not be engaged in on a recurring basis and in which the
limited partner's status would be disclosed, could lead outsiders
reasonably to believe that the limited partner actually was a general
partner.74 Although the general partners might consider it to be an
interference with their right to control, if restricted to appropriate
cases the derivative suit would have to be categorized as a war-
ranted rather than an unwarranted interference.75 Again, if re-
stricted to appropriate cases, the suit may well result in enhancing,
not dissipating, the partnership's assets.76 In addition, the cases
actually finding a violation of section 7 all have involved acts of
control much more extensive and continuous than the mere mainte-
nance of a derivative suit.7 Finally, to allow a limited partner to
(1969); Feldman, The Limited Partner's Participation in the Control of the Business, 50
CoNN. B.J. 168, 171-74, 181 (1976); see Silvola v. Rowlett, 129 Colo. 522, 526, 272 P.2d 287,
289 (1954).
71. Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 526 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Tex. 1975), rev'g 517 S.W.2d
420 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); see Holzman v. De Escamilla, 86 Cal. App. 2d 858, 195 P.2d 833
(1948).
72. 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1174, 1178-79 (1965).
73. Hecker, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Provisions 'Affecting the Relation-
ship of the Firm and Its Members to Third Parties, 27 KAN. L. REV. 1, 47-52, (1978); 26 OKRA.
L. REV. 289, 293 (1973).
74. Note, Procedures and Remedies in Limited Partners' Suits for Breach of the Gen-
eral Partner's Fiduciary Duty, 90 HARv. L. REV. 763, 776 (1977).
75. Id. at 777; 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1174, 1179 (1965).
76. 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1174, 1179 (1965).
77. Filesi v. United States, 352 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1965) (dictum); Plasteel Prods. Corp.
v. Eisenberg, 170 F. Supp. 100 (D. Mass.), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Plasteel Prods.
Corp. v. Helman, 271 F.2d 354 (1st Cir. 1959);Bergeson v. Life Ins. Corp. of America, 170 F.
Supp. 150 (D. Utah 1958) (dictum), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 265 F.2d
227 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 932 (1959); Holzman v. De Escamilla, 86 Cal. App. 2d
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maintain a derivative suit when general partners have breached
their duties, but only at the price of violating section 7, would put
the limited partner to a choice that would be inconsistent with the
basic policy of the 1916 Act-that of encouraging investment in this
form of enterprise."8
III. RECOGNITION OF DERIVATIVE Surrs BY THE 1976 ACT
Following the lead of Delaware" and New York,"0 section 1001
of the 1976 Act provides as follows:
A limited partner may bring an action in the right of a limited partnership to
recover a judgment in its favor if general partners with authority to do so have
refused to bring the action or if an effort to cause those general partners to
bring the action is not likely to succeed."'
It should be noted that this provision not only recognizes limited
partners' derivative suits but also establishes the conditions under
which they may be instituted. These conditions, in turn, are rein-
forced by the pleading requirements of section 1003.2 The following
discussion will focus first on identification of a cause of action as
derivative rather than direct,9 and then will proceed to a considera-
tion of questions concerning exhaustion of remedies and standing
that are raised by sections 1001 and 1003.
A. Derivative and Direct Causes of Action
Once a jurisdiction recognizes the possibility that a derivative
suit may be instituted by a limited partner it becomes necessary to
distinguish between causes of action accruing to the partnership as
a business entity and those accruing directly to one or more limited
partners as individuals. The distinction is necessary not only for
theoretical reasons but also because of the differing procedural re-
quirements applicable to derivative suits and individual or class
actions,' and because any money judgment recovered in a deriva-
858, 195 P.2d 833 (1948); Gast v. Petsinger, 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 394, 323 A.2d 371 (1974);
Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975).
78. 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1174, 1179 (1965).
79. DEL. CODE Am. tit. 6, § 1732 (1974).
80. N.Y. PArrNFSHrP LAW §§ 115-a to -c (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979).
81. 1976 Act § 1001.
82. Id. § 1003: "In a derivative action, the complaint shall set forth with particularity
the effort of the plaintiff to secure initiation of the action by a general partner or the reasons
for not making the effort." For a discussion of these requirements, see text accompanying
notes 94-113 infra.
83. As used in this Article, a direct cause of action refers to one that accrues to one or
more limited partners as individuals.
84. See Alpert v. Haimes, 64 Misc. 2d 608, 610, 315 N.Y.S.2d 332, 335 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
Compare, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23 with id. 23.1 and 1976 Act §§ 1001-1004.
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tive action is not the individual property of the plaintiff but must
be remitted to the partnership." Thus, it seems clear that the action
must be brought in the proper form.
New York, having recognized limited partners' derivative suits
since 1966, already has a developing body of case law concerning
this issue that should prove useful in other jurisdictions in which the
1976 Act may be adopted. As previously discussed, limited partners'
derivative suits originated, at least in part, on the basis of an anal-
ogy between a limited partner and a corporate shareholder. The
body of corporate law dealing with characterization of a cause of
action as either direct or derivative, therefore, would seem to pro-
vide a logical starting point for the partnership analysis. This, in
fact, is the route the New York courts have taken:85 the cases reveal
the use of a conceptual test in which the primary inquiries are to
whom the defendant's obligation runs and who has suffered the
direct and primary injury flowing from breach of that obligation. 7
For example, Riviera Congress Associates v. Yassky s8 involved
a suit against a tenant to recover unpaid rent under a lease in which
a limited partnership was lessor. Once the court accepted the part-
nership as an entity for purposes of analysis, it correctly concluded
that the cause of action belonged to the partnership and thus could
be asserted by limited partners on a derivative basis. The court
further noted that suit on such a cause of action must be brought
by the partnership or someone entitled to act on its behalf. 9 Simi-
larly, in Silver v. Chase Manhattan Bank,9" a limited partnership
was the sole shareholder of a corporation that had deposited funds
with the defendant bank. A class action instituted by a limited
partner on behalf of himself and all other limited partners, alleging
that the bank improperly had disbursed the corporation's funds,
was dismissed because the cause of action, if any, belonged to the
corporate depositor." The court, however, granted leave to replead
the case as a derivative action. 2
85. 1976 Act § 1004.
86. Alpert v. Haimes, 64 Misc. 2d 608, 610, 315 N.Y.S.2d 332, 335 (Sup. Ct. 1970);
Blattberg v. Weiss, 61 Misc. 2d 564, 569-70, 306 N.Y.S.2d 88, 94 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
87. Alpert v. Haimes, 64 Misc. 2d 608, 609-11, 315 N.Y.S.2d 332,335-36 (Sup. Ct. 1970);
see Silver v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 44 A.D. 2d 797, 797, 355 N.Y.S.2d 387, 388 (1974) (per
curiam).
88. 18 N.Y.2d 540, 223 N.E.2d 876, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1966).
89. Id. at 546-47, 223 N.E.2d at 879, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
90. 44 A.D. 2d 797, 355 N.Y.S.2d 387 (1974) (per curiam).
91. Id., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 388.
92. It would seem that the cause of action would be doubly derivative. That is, the
limited partner would be asserting derivatively the partnership's right to bring a shareholders'
derivative suit on behalf of the corporation. See generally Painter, Double Derivative Suits
and Other Remedies With Regard to Damaged Subsidiaries, 36 IND. L.J. 143 (1961).
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As is true in any situation involving mutually exclusive catego-
ries, close questions regarding the characterization issue will arise
and arguably incorrect results will be reached. Alpert v. Haimes1
3
is one example. There the court held that causes of action based on
the general partners' allegedly fraudulent sale of partnership
property and diversion of the proceeds could be maintained directly
by limited partners in a class action. The court reasoned that such
conduct, if proven, would constitute breach of a fiduciary duty owed
to the limited partners as individuals. At the same time, the court
held that a cause of action for unpaid rent could be maintained only
derivatively because the tenants' obligations ran exclusively to the
limited partnership. The court thus appeared to recognize the lim-
ited partnership as an entity with respect to some causes of action
but not with respect to others.
Such ambivalence on the aggregate-entity issue may make the
difficulty in characterization even greater in the limited partnership
context than it is in the corporate context. One hopes that these
problems will be alleviated as courts become more experienced in
handling limited partners' derivative suits under the 1976 Act.
B. Exhaustion of Remedies and Standing
Section 1001 of the 1976 Act permits a limited partner to bring
a derivative suit "if general partners with authority to do so have
refused to bring the action or if an effort to cause those general
partners to bring the action is not likely to succeed."94 Section 1003
provides that the complaint in a derivative action "shall set forth
with particularity the effort of the plaintiff to secure initiation of the
action by a general partner or the reasons for not making the ef-
fort."'" Taken together, these sections allow a limited partner to
institute a derivative action in either of two situations: (1) if he or
she has made an effort to secure the suit's initiation by the general
partners and they have refused; or (2) if such an effort has not been
made, the plaintiff has specified in his or her complaint the reasons
why it should be excused because of the unlikelihood of success.
Sections 1001 and 1003 apparently are patterned after the provisions
in the Delaware and New York versions of the 1916 Act that author-
ize limited partners' derivative suits. 6 These provisions, in turn, are
similar to Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (and its
93. 64 Misc. 2d 608, 315 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
94. 1976 Act § 1001.
95. Id. § 1003.




state law counterparts), which requires in a shareholders' derivative
action that the complaint "allege with particularity the efforts, if
any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the
directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the share-
holders or members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain the
action or for not making the effort.
'9 7
1. Exhaustion of Intraenterprise Remedies
The requirement that a shareholder generally make a demand
on directors as a condition precedent to bringing a derivative suit
has been viewed as a requirement that the plaintiff exhaust his or
her intracorporate remedies. That is, the plaintiff in a derivative
suit is asserting not an individual right but one belonging to another
legal entity. Because the cause of action belongs in the first instance
to the corporation, and because management of the corporation is
vested in its board of directors, it is both theoretically and practi-
cally justifiable to require the plaintiff to request that the corpora-
tion assert its right on its own behalf before allowing him or her to
file a complaint that conscripts the cause of action." These same
justifications apply in the case of a limited partnership. The 1976
Act continues the norm that control of the business and affairs of a
limited partnership rests primarily with the general partners.9 The
limited partners' derivative suit is an exception to this scheme that
should be resorted to only when it is clear that the normal manage-
ment processes have broken down, a fact that usually cannot be
determined unless the general partners have refused a request that
they take action.
If it is a foregone conclusion, however, that the general partners
will refuse the would-be plaintiff's request, the request will be ex-
cused on the basis that it would be a futile act. While section 1003
requires that the complaint "set forth with particularity" the rea-
sons why the request was not made, it does not attempt to detail
the reasons that will constitute a legally sufficient excuse. This
probably was a wise choice on the part of the drafters because it not
only will allow the law regarding excuses to develop, but will allow
it to develop consistently with a given state's law regarding excuses
for a shareholder's failure to make a demand on corporate directors.
Examples of situations in which demand has been excused in the
corporate area, and which seem readily transferable to the limited
partnership situation, include: conflict of interest on the part of the
97. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1.
98. 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.1.15[4], 23.1.19, at 23.1-92 (2d ed. 1978).
99. 1976 Act § 403.
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directors; control of the directors by the alleged wrongdoer; and
previously expressed director opposition to the suit.'®
2. Standing to Sue Derivatively
Assuming that the general partners have refused a demand to
institute the suit, or that demand has been excused as futile, the
question remains whether the limited partner is, or should be, auto-
matically entitled to maintain the action. The question essentially
is one of standing, and the prestatutory cases upholding the limited
partners' right to sue derivatively all have emphasized that the
general partners' refusal must be wrongful. In Klebanow v. New
York Produce Exchange'0' the court stated:
We would indeed expect that the New York courts would require strong
allegations and proof of disqualification or wrongful refusal by the general
partners before allowing a limited partner to sue on the partnership's behalf-a
mere difference of opinion would be nowhere near enough.82
The reason for the requirement that the general partners' re-
fusal to sue be wrongful in order to confer standing on the limited
partner again is to preserve the integrity of the norm vesting control
of the partnership's affairs in the general partners. The decision
whether it is sound policy to institute litigation normally should be
made by those to whom the statute gives control. Unless the limited
partner can demonstrate a reason transcending "a mere difference
of opinion," he or she should not be permitted to circumvent the
general partners' decision on this question to any greater extent
than on any other question of business policy.03 If, however, those
in control of the partnership's affairs are prevented from making an
unbiased decision because of a conflict of interest' ° or because they
are under the control of the alleged wrongdoer, 0 5 not only should
demand be excused, but if made and refused the limited partner
should be permitted to proceed with the action. Additionally, even
if the general partners are truly independent, there may be excep-
tional cases in which their refusal to pursue a clear cause of action
100. Comment, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative
Actions, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 168, 173-82 (1976).
101. 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965).
102. Id. at 299; accord, Riviera Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 547, 223
N.E.2d 876, 879, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386, 391 (1966); cf. McCully v. Radack, 27 Md. App. 350, 360,
340 A.2d 374, 380 (Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (allowing limited partners to intervene in a foreclo-
sure proceeding).
103. See Comment, supra note 100, at 192.
104. Riviera Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 223 N.E.2d 876, 277 N.Y.S.2d
386 (1966).
105. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965).
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is so unwarranted that such a refusal, itself, would constitute a
breach of duty.108 In such cases refusal by the general partners
should not be held to preclude standing on the part of the limited
partners.107
Sections 1001 and 1003 of the 1976 Act do not contain an ex-
press requirement that the general partners be disqualified from
making an independent judgment or that their refusal to institute
the action be wrongful. Section 115-a of the New York Partnership
Law, which presently governs the right of limited partners to sue
derivatively in New York, is also silent on this point.' °8 In Wien v.
Chelsea Theater Center,'0 a limited partner brought a derivative
suit against the officers of a labor union challenging the legality of
a provision in a collective bargaining agreement between the union
and the limited partnership. Although the general partners were
named as defendants, it does not appear that they were accused of
wrongdoing other than causing the partnership to enter into the
agreement. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the
basis, inter alia, that the limited partner lacked standing. They
argued that in addition to demand and refusal it must be demon-
strated that the refusal was improper, that there is a general consen-
sus among the partners that the suit should be brought, that the
general partners consent to the suit, or that the general partners are
unable to bring the action themselves. The court denied the motion
to dismiss on the grounds that section 115-a does not contain a
requirement that the general partners be disqualified or that their
refusal to bring the action be wrongful, and that the purpose of the
section was to afford limited partners the same rights as sharehold-
ers to sue derivatively."10
The ultimate holding of the Wien case is unclear. It can be read
as completely disposing of the standing issue. If this reading is cor-
rect the decision is subject to criticism on three bases. First, it gives
an unwarranted exclusivity to section 115-a; second, it fails to recog-
nize the existence of a standing requirement in shareholders' deriva-
tive suits; and third, it thus distorts the statutory balance of power
in limited partnerships. On the other hand, the case can be read
more narrowly as merely holding that the standing issue cannot be
106. Cf. Groel v. United Elec. Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 616, 61 A. 1061 (Ch. 1905) (shareholders'
derivative suit).
107. For a thorough discussion of the standing requirement in the context of sharehold-
ers' derivative suits, see Comment, supra note 100, at 191-98.
108. See N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 115-a (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979).
109. 91 Misc. 2d 226, 397 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 66 A.D.
2d 741, 411 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1978).
110. Id. at 228, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
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resolved without at least a limited evidentiary hearing."' If this
interpretation is correct, the court's failure to grant judgment for
the defendants on the pleadings is not necessarily inconsistent with
the existence of a requirement that the general partners be disquali-
fied from making an independent judgment or that their refusal to
sue be wrongful.
As stated above, if Wien holds that a limited partner will have
standing merely on the basis of an allegation that the general part-
ners have refused to bring the action, the decision gives an unwar-
ranted exclusivity to the provisons of section 115-a. Whatever the
law in New York, one hopes that the absence of an explicit disquali-
fication or wrongful refusal requirement in sections 1001 and 1003
will not result in such a construction under the 1976 Act. Typical
provisions permitting shareholders' derivative suits do not contain
such an express requirement, ,,2 but this has not prevented the courts
from insisting that a shareholder demonstrate his or her standing to
maintain the action."3 Certainly, there is nothing in the 1976 Act
to prevent the imposition of a disqualification or wrongful refusal
requirement. In fact, such a requirement would further the policy
of the Act: control would remain primarily in the general partners
but limited partners would have a remedy for extraordinary cases.
Sections 1001 and 1003, therefore, should be interpreted to require
the plaintiff-limited partner to demonstrate his or her standing to
maintain the action. Thus, unless the general partners are for some
reason (such as conflict of interest) prevented from making an un-
biased judgment on the question whether to institute litigation, not
only should demand not be excused, but if made and refused the
limited partner ordinarily should be barred from maintaining the
action.
IV. PROPER PLAINTIFF-MEMBERSHIP REQUIREMENTS
Section 1002 of the 1976 Act imposes two major requirements
regarding the times at which the plaintiff in a derivative suit must
be a partner. It provides:
In a derivative action, the plaintiff must be a partner at the time of bringing
the action and (1) at the time of the transaction of which he complains or (2)
his status as a partner had devolved upon him by operation of law or pursuant
to the terms of the partnership agreement from a person who was a partner at
the time of the transaction."'
111. See McCully v. Radack, 27 Md. App. 350, 360, 340 A.2d 374, 380 (Ct. Spec. App.
1975); Comment, supra note 100, at 198-200.
112. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
113. See, e.g., Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1957).
114. 1976 Act § 1002.
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These requirements, apparently patterned after the Delaware and
New York versions of the 1916 Act,1"5 raise a number of construc-
tional and other problems. The following discussion will focus first
on the requirement that the plaintiff be a partner at the time he or
she brings the action, next on the requirement that the plaintiff
have been a partner at the time of the transaction of which he or
she complains, and finally on issues that may arise if the action is
brought in federal court.
A. Partner at the Time of Suit
As previously stated, section 1002's requirement that the plain-
tiff be a partner at the time he or she brings the action appears to
be patterned after analogous provisions of Delaware and New York
law."' It also is similar to statutes governing shareholders' deriva-
tive suits in some states."7 The reason for such provisions is that the
shareholder's standing to assert the corporation's cause of action is
based upon his or her proprietary interest in the corporation, and
thus upon his or her indirect pecuniary interest in the cause of
action." Courts in other states have felt that this idea is implicit
in the nature of a derivative suit and have imposed a "shareholder
at the time of the suit" requirement without the aid of an explicit
statute or court rule."' Because this same reasoning applies to lim-
ited partnerships, section 1002 properly restricts would-be deriva-
tive plaintiffs to those with an indirect proprietary stake in the
litigation.
It should be noted, however, that section 1002 requires only that
the plaintiff be a partner at the time of "bringing" the action; it
does not require expressly that the plaintiff remain a partner
throughout the continuance of the litigation. The prevailing corpo-
rate view appears to be that maintenance of shareholder status
throughout the course of the litigation is necessary to maintenance
115. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1732(b) (1974); N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 115-a(2)
(McKinney Supp. 1978-1979). It should be noted that unlike the Delaware and New York
laws, § 1002 does not require that the plaintiff be a limited partner at the relevant times.
Instead, it uses the term "partner," which includes both limited and general partners. 1976
Act § 101(8). Thus, § 1002 would seem to permit suit by one who was a general partner at
the time of the challenged transaction but who subsequently lost that status, became a
limited partner, and retained the latter status at the time of bringing the suit.
116. The value of these provisions to the present analysis is limited, however, by their
never having been interpreted by the courts of their respective states.
117. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 22-615(a) (1977); N.Y. Bus. Cor'. LAW § 626(b) (McKinney
1963).
118. Tenney v. Rosenthal, 6 N.Y.2d 204, 211, 160 N.E.2d 463, 466, 189 N.Y.S.2d 158,
163 (1959) (dictum).
119. E.g., Dann v. Chrysler Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 103, 174 A.2d 696 (1961).
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of the action. If the plaintiff disposes of all his or her shares after
filing the complaint but before judgment, the action has been held
to abate, at least as to that particular plaintiff. 0 Such holdings are
in accord with the theory that it is the proprietary nature of the
plaintiff's interest that is the technical foundation of his or her right
to assert the cause of action. Interpreting section 1002 to require
partner status only when the complaint is filed would run counter
to this theory, which is equally applicable to limited partnerships.
This would permit the anomaly of a lawsuit controlled by one with
no financial interest in its outcome. In short, there is every justifica-
tion for interpreting section 1002 the way its corporate law counter-
parts have been construed, and for requiring the plaintiff to remain
a partner throughout the course of the litigation.'
B. Partner at Time of Alleged Wrong
1. General Rule
With two exceptions, to be discussed below, section 1002 also
provides that the plaintiff must have been a partner at the time of
the transaction of which he or she complains."' This provision,
which will be referred to as the contemporaneous membership rule,
again appears to be patterned after the Delaware and New York
versions of the 1916 Act. All three statutes reflect an incorporation
into limited partnership law of the contemporaneous ownership rule
applicable to shareholders' derivative suits in a majority of states
and in the federal courts.123
This requirement of ownership contemporaneous with the al-
leged wrong, originating in the Supreme Court's decision in Hawes
120. E.g., Heit v. Tenneco, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 884 (D. Del. 1970); Harff v. Kerkorian,
324 A.2d 215 (Del. Ch. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 347 A.2d 133 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1975)
(dictum); Tenney v. Rosenthal, 6 N.Y.2d 204, 160 N.E.2d 463, 189 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1959)
(dictum); Gleicher v. Times-Columbia Distrib., Inc., 283 A.D. 709, 128 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1954)
(per curiam); Sorin v. Shahmoon Indus., Inc., 30 Misc. 2d 429, 220 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Sup. Ct.
1961); Johnson v. Baldwin, 221 S.E. 141, 69 S.E. 585 (1952).
121. It would seem that a partnership interest, however small, would be sufficient for
purposes of § 1002. Cf. H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 361 (2d ed. 1970)
(size of stock ownership immaterial). For this reason, and because § 1004 permits an award
of fees to the attorney of a successful plaintiff, it could be argued that, as a practical matter,
the relevant financial interest in the outcome of the case is that of the plaintiffs attorney
rather than that of the plaintiff. Therefore, it should make no difference whether the plaintiff
continues as a partner throughout the course of the litigation. This argument, however, is
equally applicable to the narrow requirement that the plaintiff be a partner at the time of
filing the complaint. Thus, under even the most restrictive interpretation of § 1002, it must
be considered as having been rejected by the drafters of the 1976 Act.
122. 1976 Act § 1002.
123. H. HEN, supra note 121, at § 362; Harbrecht, The Contemporaneous Ownership
Rule in Shareholders' Derivative Suits, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1041, 1043 (1978).
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v. Oakland, 21 has been justified on three bases. The first, relevant
only to litigation in the federal courts, is that it prevents transfer of
shares to a willing nonresident in order to create diversity jurisdic-
tion.' 2 The second and most commonly proffered reason is that the
rule is designed to prevent persons from purchasing shares after the
fact solely for the purpose of instituting derivative litigation.'26 The
concern underlying this rationale presumably is that such
"purchased lawsuits" are likely to be pressed more for their nuis-
ance value than to redress real wrongs. The third justification is that
a plaintiff who had no proprietary interest in the enterprise at the
time the wrong occurred simply has suffered no injury.'27 Although
one might argue that the contemporaneous ownership or member-
ship rule is an inappropriate vehicle to implement the policies un-
derlying these reasons,'1 such arguments are beyond the scope of
this Article. The following discussion will proceed on the premise
that inclusion of a contemporaneous membership rule in the 1976
Act is justifiable from a policy standpoint and will concentrate on
problems raised by the manner in which it has been drafted.
By generally requiring the plaintiff to have been a partner "at
the time of the transaction of which he complains," section 1002
adopts almost verbatim the language of the original contempora-
neous ownership rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in Hawes
v. Oakland. ,21 Since most provisions regulating shareholders' deriva-
tive suits also use this formulation,'30 courts and commentators may
draw upon an already existing, voluminous body of interpretive case
law.
Not surprisingly, the crucial issue raised by this language is the
determination of when a transaction has occurred. In many cases
resolution of the question will be straightforward. For example, if a
general partner fraudulently misappropriates partnership assets in
January, and the plaintiff does not become a partner until June, the
plaintiff's suit would seem to be barred by the contemporaneous
membership rule. In analogous corporate cases, however, sharehold-
ers sometimes have sought to avoid the impact of the contempora-
124. 104 U.S. 450 (1882).
125. See, e.g., id.; Quincy v. Steel, 120 U.S. 241 (1887).
126. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (dictum);
Dimpfell v. Ohio & Miss. Ry., 110 U.S. 209 (1884); Hirshfield v. Briskin, 447 F.2d 694 (7th
Cir. 1971).
127. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Ball, 305 Ill. App. 273, 27 N.E.2d 575 (1940); Home Fire Ins.
Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024 (1903).
128. See Harbrecht, supra note 123, at 1060-66.
129. 104 U.S. 450, 461 (1882).
130. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 626(b) (McKinney 1963).
[Vol. 33:343
LIMITED PARTNERS' SUITS
neous ownership rule by arguing, in effect, that the original wrong
continues as long as it remains unremedied. Therefore, while the
acquisition of their shares postdates the original transaction, the
plaintiffs' ownership of shares is contemporaneous with a wrong
done to the corporation. Such arguments generally have failed be-
cause the courts have realized that, if accepted, they would all but
eliminate the requirement of contemporaneous ownership.'
3'
In other cases, pinpointing the time of a transaction may be
more difficult. For example, a general partner may lease property
from the limited partnership under a long term lease at an unfairly
low rental. Or, a general partner may sell property to the limited
partnership at an excessive price on an installment basis. In these
sorts of cases the plaintiff may become a partner after the original
bargain is struck but while its obligations are being performed. The
argument of a continuing wrong has considerably more appeal in
such circumstances and has been accepted by some courts in share-
holders' derivative suits.'3 2 Other courts, however, reject the argu-
ment on the basis that the continuing performance is vulnerable to
attack only if the original bargain is vulnerable, and consideration
of the latter issue is barred by the contemporaneous ownership
rule. 33 Because of this sharp division of authority over language
virtually identical to that of section 1002, one may expect a less than
uniform interpretation of this provision of the 1976 Act.
2. Exceptions to the Rule
As noted above, section 1002 contains two exceptions to the
contemporaneous membership rule. Even if the plaintiff in a limited
partners' derivative suit was not a partner at the time of the alleged
wrong, the action still may be maintained if "his status as a partner
. . .devolved upon him by operation of law or pursuant to the terms
of the partnership agreement from a person who was a partner at
the time of the transaction.' 34 Like the contemporaneous member-
131. See, e.g., Weinhaus v. Gale, 237 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1956); Henis v. Compania
Agricola de Guatemala, 116 F. Supp. 223 (D. Del. 1953), affl'd, 210 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1954)
(alternative holding); McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 22 F. Supp. 867 (D. Md.
1938), aff'd, 112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 695 (1940); Newkirk v. W.J.
Rainey, Inc., 31 Del. Ch. 433, 76 A.2d 121 (1950); Weinstein v. Behn, 65 N.Y.S.2d 536 (Sup.
Ct. 1946), affld, 272 A.D. 1045, 75 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1947) (alternative holding).
132. See, e.g., Lawson v. Krock, 17 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 700 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam);
Palmer v. Morris, 316 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963); Hoff v. Sprayregan, 52 F.R.D. 243 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (alternative holding).
133. See, e.g., Lowell Wiper Supply Co. v. Helen Shop, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); Levitan v. Stout, 97 F. Supp. 105 (W.D. Ky. 1951); Goldie v. Yaker, 78 N.M. 485, 432
P.2d 841 (1967); Chaft v. Kass, 19 A.D.2d 610, 241 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1963) (per curiam).
134. 1976 Act § 1002(2).
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ship rule itself, the exception for devolution by operation of law
originated with Hawes v. Oakland, 115and is substantially similar to
its corporate law counterparts.
Strictly defined, devolution by operation of law refers to the
passing of property without any intentional or voluntary act by
either the previous or new owner.'36 If this definition were rigidly
applied, few methods of acquisition other than by intestate succes-
sion would qualify. Corporate cases, however, have tended to apply
the exception with some flexibility. Thus, the acquisition of stock
pursuant to the terms of a will has been viewed as a taking by
operation of law even though the transaction technically is a private
donative act of the testator or textatrix. 131 In Salter v. Columbia
Concerts, Inc.,' the court summarized its rationale as follows:
So far as the question for decision here is concerned, no real distinction is found
between intestate and testate succession. In each case the critical event from
which the succession springs is death, an event over which the decedent has
no control. What follows in the disposition of the property left by him is as
much the operation of law in the one case as in the other.
3
These courts have tended to focus on the purpose of the contempor-
aneous ownership rule as preventing speculation in litigation, and,
finding the danger absent in a transfer of shares occasioned by
death, have held the acquisition to be within at least the spirit of
the exception. "'
Voluntary inter vivos transfers, however, generally have been
held to fall outside the scope of the operation of law exception. For
example, acquisition of shares from the grantor by trustees of a
135. 104 U.S. 450, 461 (1882).
136. Whitaker v. Whitaker Iron Co., 249 F. 531, 536 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 248 U.S.
564 (1918); McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 22 F. Supp. 867, 872 (D. Md. 1938),
affl'd, 112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 695 (1940).
137. Phillips v. Bradford, 62 F.R.D. 681, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); McQuillen v. National
Cash Register Co., 22 F. Supp. 867, 872 (D. Md. 1938), affl'd, 112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 695 (1940); Salter v. Columbia Concerts, Inc., 191 Misc. 479, 77 N.Y.S.2d
703 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
138. 191 Misc. 479, 77 N.Y.S.2d 703 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
139. Id. at 481, 77 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
140. In Hirshfield v. Briskin, 447 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1971), the plaintiff acquired shares
from her husband's estate pursuant to an agreement settling a dispute over ownership of the
shares. The court, in holding the operation of law exception to be applicable, stated:
The transfer to her of the shares was not in all respects solely and perfectly a result of
the operation of law, and some element of bargain or consent was present. Yet we think
her acquisition sufficiently approximated a devolution by operation of law and did not
present the sort of occurrences involving speculation, champerty, or collusion to confer
jurisdiction, which Rule 23.1 seeks to preclude.
Id. at 698 (footnote omitted). See also Helfand v. Gambee, 37 Del. Ch. 51, 136 A.2d 558 (1957)
(acquisition of shares pursuant to corporate reorganization for which plaintiff had voted held
to be by operation of law).
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revocable inter vivos trust has been held to be a taking by contract
and not by law."' Although the problem of speculation in litigation
may not be present on the facts of a particular case, such holdings
seem to be based on the fear that a rule extending the exception to
circumstances in which both the timing of the transfer and the
identity of the transferee are within the control of private parties
simply would be too dangerous a door to open.
These corporate law cases may be indicative of how the opera-
tion of law exception will be interpreted in the limited partnership
context. The matter is slightly more complicated, however, for while
a transfer of corporate shares will carry with it a transfer of share-
holder status, a transfer of a limited partner's interest in the part-
nership will not necessarily make the transferee a limited partner.4 2
Under the 1976 Act, after the initial formation of the limited part-
nership, there are five ways in which a person may acquire the
status of a limited partner. First, a person who acquires a partner-
ship interest directly from the limited partnership may become a
limited partner upon compliance with the applicable provisions of
the partnership agreement, or, if none, upon the unanimous written
consent of the partners."' Second, a person who acquires a partner-
ship interest from an existing partner may become a limited partner
if the transferor, pursuant to authority contained in the certificate
of limited partnership, possesses and exercises the power to give his
or her assignee the right to become a limited partner.' Third, a
person who acquires a partnership interest from an existing partner
may become a limited partner upon the unanimous consent of the
other partners. 5 Fourth, the executor, administrator, guardian, or
conservator of a deceased or incompetent partner may exercise all
of the partner's rights for the purpose of settling or administering
the partner's estate.'46 Fifth, a person who acquires a partnership
141. Stephenson v. Landegger, 337 F. Supp. 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), affl'd, 464 F.2d 133
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1039 (1972); Myer v. Myer, 271 A.D. 465, 66 N.Y.S.2d 83
(1946), affl'd, 296 N.Y. 979, 73 N.E.2d 562 (1947).
142. See 1976 Act § 702.
143. Id. § 301(a)(1).
144. Id. §§ 301(a)(2), 704(a).
145. Id. § 704(a).
146. Id. § 705. It would appear from the wording of § 705 that the partner's personal
representative merely possesses the partner's rights but does not become an actual partner.
Although for many purposes the distinction will be purely academic, it could have a signifi-
cant practical impact under § 1002. If the deceased or incompetent partner was not a partner
at the time of an allegedly wrongful transaction, and if his or her personal representative
merely possesses the partner's rights, then suit will be barred by the contemporaneous mem-
bership rule of § 1002. If, however, the personal representative is deemed to become an actual
partner by operation of law, and if such status is not required to devolve from one who was a
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interest from the estate of a deceased or incompetent partner who
had the power to grant his or her assignee the right to become a
limited partner may become a limited partner if the personal repre-
sentative of the deceased or incompetent partner exercises such
power. 147
Of the five methods by which a person may acquire the status
of a limited partner, the first three are simply outright, voluntary
purchases that do not even approximate a devolution by operation
of law; all three easily could involve the kind of speculation in
litigation that the contemporaneous membership rule presumably
was designed to prevent. As such, they appear to fall outside the
scope of the exception. The fourth method, acquisition by the per-
sonal representative of a deceased or incompetent partner would
seem to be the clearest case of a devolution by operation of law since
it involves a transfer of status triggered by an involuntary and un-
premeditated event and impelled primarily by the provisions of the
1976 Act itself.48
The fifth method, acquisition by a person from the estate of a
deceased or incompetent partner pursuant to a grant by the part-
ner's personal representative, is somewhat more difficult because
such a transfer requires a voluntary act by the personal representa-
tive. In the case of a deceased partner, however, the element of
volition will be more theoretical than real. The requirement of an
affirmative grant to an assignee of the right to become a limited
partner derives from the traditional view that partnerships are con-
sensual relationships whose members are free to choose their asso-
ciates. Thus, an assignee of a partnership interest generally will not
have the right to become a limited partner unless the other partners
consent. 4 ' This consent may be given either specifically, after the
assignment, or generally, in advance of the assignment through in-
clusion in the certificate of limited partnership of a provision giving
the partners authority unilaterally to make their assignees limited
partners. 5 If the certificate contains such a provision the concept
of delectus personae is largely fictional; the requirement of an af-
firmative grant of the right to become a limited partner is largely
vestigial. If a partner in such a limited partnership dies, testate or
intestate, his or her personal representative normally would exercise
partner contemporaneous with the wrong, then suit will not be barred. For a discussion of
the latter issue, see text accompanying notes 151-62 infra.
147. 1976 Act § 705.
148. See id.
149. Id. §§ 702, 704(a).
150. Id. §§ 301(a)(2), 704(a). Such provisions generally will be included in the certifi-
cates of large, commercial limited partnerships.
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the power, granting the right to become a limited partner to the
person succeeding to the partnership interest. In fact, the personal
representative might even have a fiduciary duty to exercise such a
power so that the legatee or heir could enjoy fully the property
interest to which he or she succeeded. In this situation the analogy
to testate or intestate succession to corporate stock is close if not
compelling. For this reason, and because this situation generally
would not present the danger of speculation in litigation, it should
be held that the legatee or heir acquired his or her status as a limited
partner by operation of law.
A person who acquires his or her status as a limited partner
through an assignment from and grant by the guardian or conserva-
tor of an incompetent partner should be treated differently. Incom-
petency, unlike death, will not operate to transfer equitable title to
the underlying partnership interest. Therefore, a person succeeding
to the interest will do so only by reason of a voluntary and inten-
tional assignment of the interest by the incompetent partner's per-
sonal representative. Such an assignment with a grant of the right
to become a limited partner is as much an outright sale as a similar
transaction engaged in by the original partner himself or herself.
Since the danger of fostering speculative litigation is equally present
in both cases, neither should be held to be a devolution by operation
of law.
A final issue concerning the devolution by operation of law
exception is whether the devolution must be from a person who was
a partner at the time of the transaction that is the subject of the
litigation. As noted above, section 1002 requires that the plaintiff
in a derivative suit have been a partner at the time of the transac-
tion or that "his status as a partner . . . devolved upon him by
operation of law or pursuant to the terms of the partnership agree-
ment from a person who was a partner at the time of the transac-
tion."' 5 ' Because the section is not punctuated and is devoid of any
commentary from the drafters, it is possible to interpret the final
clause either as modifying both methods of devolution or as modify-
ing only devolution pursuant to the partnership agreement. In order
to consider this question it first is necessary to determine what
devolution "pursuant to the terms of the partnership agreement"
means.
"Partnership agreement" is defined in the 1976 Act as "any
valid agreement, written or oral, of the partners as to the affairs of
a limited partnership and the conduct of its business."'' 5 Limited
151. Id. § 1002(2).
152. Id. § 101(9).
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partnership agreements drafted under the 1916 Act commonly in-
clude provisions regulating the assignment of partnership interests
and the ability of an assignee to assume the status of a limited
partner.'13 This practice seems compatible with the 1976 Act and
presumably will continue. With respect to assignments, section 702
specifically states: "Except as provided in the partnership agree-
ment, a partnership interest is assignable in whole or in part."' 5 As
already noted, however, a simple assignment does not give the as-
signee the right to become a limited partner.'55 The assignee may
become a limited partner only if the assignor gives him or her that
right or if all other partners consent.' 6 If the assignor's power to give
that right is restricted or conditional, the restrictions or conditions,
as well as the power itself, must be stated in the certificate of lim-
ited partnership. 5 7 This is not to say that such power, restrictions,
or conditions could not also be stated in the partnership agreement,
but it does seem that the validity of provisions appearing only in the
partnership agreement could be questioned. With this in mind, sec-
tion 1002's reference to devolution pursuant to the terms of the
partnership agreement, and its concurrent failure to mention devo-
lution pursuant to the terms of the certificate of limited partner-
ship, would seem to indicate that voluntary assignments which in-
clude the grant of a right to become a limited partner are not within
the intended scope of the exception to the contemporaneous mem-
bership rule.' 8
Another provision sometimes included in limited partnership
agreements is one giving the partnership, other partners, or desig-
nated third parties the option to purchase a partner's interest upon
the occurrence of a stated event such as death, incapacity, or with-
drawal from the partnership. 5 ' Because the focus of both this Arti-
cle and section 1002 is the limited partners' derivative suit, pur-
chases by the partnership will not be considered in the following
discussion.
To the extent that the partnership agreement gives an option
153. See, e.g., 1 J. RASKIN & M. JOHNSON, CuRRENT LEGAL FoRms WITH TAX ANALYSIS
Forms 2.01 7(b), 2.09 $ 9, 2.12 % 14, 2.12A Art. XVI, 2.13 Art. 13, 2.13A Art. IX, 2.14 Art.
XIV (1979).
154. 1976 Act § 702. The introductory phrase was included to make it clear that the
partnership agreement can restrict assignability. Id. Comment.
155. Id. § 702.
156. Id. §§ 301(a)(2), 704(a).
157. Id. §§ 201(a)(7), 301(a)(2).
158. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1732(b) (1974); N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 115-
a(2) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979).
159. See, e.g., 1 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, supra note 153, Forms 2.11 Art. VII, 2.12A §
14.4, 2.19 Art. V.
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to purchase a partner's interest to a person other than an existing
partner, it would be necessary, for purposes of section 1002, that the
certificate of limited partnership contain authority for the selling
partner, or his or her personal representative, to grant the purchaser
the right to become a limited partner.6 0 The provisions in the agree-
ment creating the option would not be inconsistent with or super-
fluous to this authority, but simply would describe the circumstan-
ces under which the option-holder would have a right to purchase.
Therefore, such a person arguably could be one whose status as a
partner devolved upon him or her at least primarily "pursuant to
the terms of the partnership agreement."
Generally, however, the option will run to existing partners, as
a common purpose of such an option is to preserve each partici-
pant's proportionate interest in the enterprise. If one of the purchas-
ing partners wished to institute a derivative action challenging a
transaction that was complete before he or she became a partner,
he or she might attempt to claim the benefit of the devolution
pursuant to the partnership agreement exception on the basis of the
additional partnership interest acquired under the option. Since the
exception is phrased in terms of the devolution of status as a part-
ner, a claim of this sort is open to attack. If a person already is a
partner, that status will exist independently of, and will not be
enhanced by, the exercise of an option to acquire another partner's
interest. The purchasing partner, therefore, would appear to be out-
side the scope of the exception. For policy purposes, however, a
purchase by an existing but noncontemporaneous partner is sub-
stantially equivalent to a purchase by an outsider, and, therefore,
it will be assumed that the objection relating to pre-existing status
is not insurmountable.
Assuming, then, that devolution "pursuant to the terms of the
partnership agreement" refers to the situation in which an outsider
(for example, a family member) or an existing but noncontempor-
aneous partner purchases another partner's interest pursuant to an
option granted by the partnership agreement, it becomes necessary
to consider why the drafters wished to confer standing on the pur-
chaser only if the seller was a partner at the time of the alleged
wrong. Since we are dealing with an exception to the contempora-
neous membership rule it seems appropriate to re-examine the pos-
sible purposes of the rule itself.
Three principal rationales have been offered to justify the anal-
ogous shareholders' contemporaneous ownership rule-prevention
160. See 1976 Act §§ 301(a)(2), 704(a)(1).
1980]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
of suits in federal courts on the basis of collusively obtained diver-
sity jurisdiction; prevention of the litigation of purchased griev-
ances; and the theory that a shareholder who had no interest at the
time of the alleged wrong has suffered no injury and thus has no
equitable basis for asserting the corporation's cause of action. Pre-
vention of a collusive transfer to obtain diversity jurisdiction ob-
viously is inapplicable to a provision in proposed uniform state leg-
islation and need not be discussed further.
Preventing unscrupulous persons from purchasing for the sole
or chief purpose of instituting a derivative suit is the most com-
monly advanced reason for the corporate contemporaneous owner-
ship rule, and it is probable that similar considerations prompted
section 1002's contemporaneous membership rule. It seems unlikely
that one purchasing pursuant to an option in a partnership agree-
ment would do so just to file a suit, as the option would offer little
opportunity for this type of speculation. First, the event that gives
rise to the option will not be in the control of the purchaser, and, in
the case of death or incapacity, will not even be in the control of the
seller. Second, the purchaser normally will be a person with a pre-
vious relationship either to the seller or to the limited partnership,
one whose identity will be prescribed in advance in the agreement,
either specifically or by class. Thus, an exception to the rule of
contemporaneity for this sort of purchaser seems appropriate. But
even assuming there is a possibility for speculative abuse in this
situation, requiring the seller to have been a partner at the time of
the challenged transaction would afford no additional protection, as
there is no necessary correlation between a seller's status and a
purchaser's motives. If this analysis is correct, it would follow that
the requirement of contemporaneous membership by the former
partner was not designed to prevent this sort of speculation in litiga-
tion. This conclusion, in turn, would support a construction of the
requirement as being applicable both to devolution pursuant to the
partnership agreement and to devolution by operation of law.'"
A related type of abuse, requiring cooperation between the
seller and purchaser, could occur under a partnership agreement
containing an option exercisable upon the withdrawal of a partner.
In this situation a partner who could not institute a-derivative ac-
tion personally because he or she lacked the necessary status at the
time of the transaction could withdraw, permitting the option-
161. The provisions governing shareholders' derivative suits in some jurisdictions un-
ambiguously require that shares devolving by operation of law pass from a contemporaneous
owner. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(b)(1) (West 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-615(a)(1) (1977);
MASS. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 156B, § 46 (West 1970).
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holder to acquire his or her partnership interest (and if an outsider,
status as a new limited partner) for the purpose of bringing the
derivative suit.' This sort of collusive transfer would be prevented
by the requirement that the seller be a contemporaneous partner,
and so could justify that requirement in section 1002. Under this
analysis the requirement would not be construed as applying to
devolutions by operation of law because of their distinguishing in-
voluntary character. Of course, under this analysis the requirement
of seller contemporaneity would be overly broad because it also
would apply to transfers pursuant to the partnership agreement that
approximate devolutions by operation of law, such as options trig-
gered by death or incapacity rather than withdrawal. In addition,
the coalition of elements necessary for an actual collusive transfer
of the type described probably would not occur very often. For these
reasons, although the requirement has the effect of preventing these
transfers, it seems unlikely that this is its primary goal.
Finally, it is possible that the requirement of seller contempor-
aneity is based on the injured party rationale. If the seller was a
partner at the time of the alleged wrong, he or she personally suf-
fered an indirect injury and would have an equitable basis for as-
serting the partnership's cause of action. An option-holder purchas-
ing pursuant to the partnership agreement from such a partner
could be viewed as succeeding to the seller's status as an injured
party as well as to his or her status as a partner. Thus, although no
subsequent purchasers will have suffered an injury personally, those
who purchase from a contemporaneous partner could be thought to
have a greater equitable basis for instituting a derivative action
than those who purchase from a noncontemporaneous partner.
Under this analysis, of course, no rational distinction could be made
between those who take pursuant to the partnership agreement and
those who take purely by operation of law, with the result that the
transferor contemporaneity requirement would be construed as
modifying both methods of devolution.
If this view is correct, then section 1002 actually consists of a
combination of two of the traditional rationales for the contempora-
neous ownership rule. Its general rule prevents speculation in litiga-
tion by giving standing only to those who were partners at the time
of the challenged transaction. The two exceptions to this rule seem
designed to permit suit by noncontemporaneous partners only if
they became partners in a manner not readily susceptible to specu-
lative activity. In addition, the general rule could be seen as em-
162. See Harbrecht, supra note 123, at 1059 & n.75.
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bodying the notion that only those who have suffered an indirect
injury as a result of the alleged wrong should have standing to assert
the partnership's cause of action. The requirement that a noncon-
temporaneous partner acquire his or her status from a contempora-
neous partner seems most logically supportable if it applies to both
exceptions on the basis of the injured party rationale, and thus
reinforces this reading of section 1002.
C. Potential Conflict with Federal Rule 23.1
A final problem raised by section 1002 is its potential conflict
with Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure insofar as that
Rule applies to a limited partners' derivative suit instituted in fed-
eral court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. If Rule 23.1 is broad
enough to encompass derivative suits brought on behalf of limited
partnerships as well as those brought on behalf of corporations, then
to the extent that its provisions respecting contemporaneity differ
from those of section 1002 such a conflict appears inevitable.,
163. It is possible that the 1976 Act may have the indirect and unintended effect of
drastically curtailing federal diversity jurisdiction with respect to limited partnerships. The
general rule in suits involving unincorporated associations is that the citizenship of each
member of the association is relevant for purposes of determining whether complete diversity
exists between plaintiffs and defendants. United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382
U.S. 145 (1965); Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900); Chapman
v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677 (1889). At present, there is a division of authority on the question
whether the citizenship of limited partners in limited partnerships formed under the 1916 Act
must be considered under this general rule. The leading case holding that limited partners'
citizenship need not be considered is Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966). In that case Judge Friendly based his decision
principally on § 26 of the 1916 Act, which provides that, "A contributor, unless he is a general
partner, is not a proper party to proceedings by or against a partnership, except where the
object is to enforce a limited partner's right against or liability to the partnership." 1916 Act
§ 26. Since limited partners were not proper parties to proceedings by or against limited
partnerships, he reasoned, their citizenship was irrelevant for purposes of diversity jurisdic-
tion. 358 F.2d at 183-84. Judge Friendly avoided the effect of his holding in Klebanow v. New
York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965), that limited partners could maintain a
derivative suit on behalf of the partnership, by noting that New York subsequently had held
to the contrary in Millard v. Newmark & Co., 24 A.D.2d 333, 266 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1966). 358
F.2d at 184 n.7. The leading case requiring that limited partners' citizenship be considered
is Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977). In
a strong dissent Judge Hunter urged adoption of the Colonial Realty rule, but indicated that
his views might be different if the relevant state law permitted limited partners to sue
derivatively. After noting the holding in Riviera Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540,
223 N.E.2d 876, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1966), which overruled Millard and authorized derivative
actions in New York, he stated:
That procedure has been adopted by the New York legislature, as well as by Delaware,
and is a 1976 proposed revision to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act. If such deriva-
tive suit were brought in diversity, then it might be appropriate to look at the citizenship
of the limited partners.
554 F.2d at 1265 n.10.
LIMITED PARTNERS' SUITS
Rule 23.1, in pertinent part, provides:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to
enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corpo-
ration or association having failed to enforce a right which may properly be
asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified and shall allege (1) that the
plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of which
he complains or that his share or membership thereafter devolved on him by
operation of law . . . .6
It is clear from the language quoted that the Rule establishes the
conditions precedent for derivative suits by members of unincorpor-
ated associations as well as those by shareholders of corporations.
The existing case law provides little guidance on the question
whether limited partnerships are unincorporated associations for
purposes of Rule 23.1. At least one decision assumes without discus-
sion that they are, 6' and this result is consistent with the general
usage of that term in the context of federal civil procedure. ", Thus,
Rule 23.1 would seem at least potentially applicable in limited part-
ners' derivative suits brought in federal court. If the basis of federal
jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship the question arises whether
the federal court will apply Rule 23.1 or section 1002 of the 1976 Act
as the proper standard of contemporaneity.
Based upon the experience in shareholders' derivative suits the
answer to some extent may depend upon which of the two standards
is the stricter. The general rule of section 1002 requiring contempor-
aneous membership is virtually identical to that of Rule 23.1. Sec-
tion 1002, however, provides more exceptions, allowing suits by non-
contemporaneous partners who acquired their status either by oper-
ation of law or pursuant to the partnership agreement, while Rule
23.1 would permit suit only by the former.
The tendency of the federal courts, when confronted with a
situation in which state law would permit a shareholder to sue deriv-
atively but Rule 23.1 would not, has been to apply the stricter Fed-
eral Rule.'67 These decisions, in effect, hold the matter to be purely
164. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
165. In re King Resources Co. Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 610 (D. Colo. 1976).
166. FED. R. Cv. P. 17(b)(1) uses the phraseology "partnership or other unincorporated
association" (emphasis added). "Unincorporated association" has been held to mean the
same thing under id. 23.2 as under 17(b)(1), see Lee v. Navarro Say. Ass'n, 416 F. Supp. 1186
(N.D. Tex. 1976); Suchem, Inc. v. Central Aguirre Sugar Co., 52 F.R.D. 348 (D.P.R. 1971),
and thus to include partnerships. Pyle v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 634
(D. Or. 1972). As discussed in note 163, supra, limited partnerships specifically have been
held to be unincorporated associations for jurisdictional purposes. Carlsberg Resources Corp.
v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977).
167. E.g., Elkins v. Bricker, 147 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Kaufman v. Wolfson,
136 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Perrott v. United States Banking Corp., 53 F. Supp. 953
(D. Del. 1944); Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 44 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1942);
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procedural rather than substantive. " " Although the precise issue has
never been decided by the Supreme Court, this result is supported
by Hanna v. Plumer,111 in which the Court stated:
When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the question facing
the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie choice: the
court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so
only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima
facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the
Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.'7
It is further supported by dictum in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp., 7 , to the effect that Rule 23.1 is applicable in a federal
diversity case even if the relevant state law contains no similar
provision.1
2
In another respect, however, section 1002 may be stricter than
Rule 23.1. The operation of law exception in the 1976 Act can be
construed to require devolution from a contemporaneous partner
while Rule 23.1 contains no such restriction. It is more difficult to
predict what a federal court would do in a situation in which the
plaintiff would be barred from suing in state court but would not
be barred in federal court if Rule 23.1 rather than section 1002 were
applied.
In In re Penn Central Transportation Co., 73 the court, reversing
a prior ruling,'74 held that a shareholder was barred from suing de-
rivatively by New York's contemporaneous ownership rule even
though the suit would not have been barred under the court's inter-
pretation of Rule 23.1. It reasoned that the New York rule was
substantive and so must be applied in a federal diversity case under
the principle of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. "I In support of its con-
clusion, the court relied on Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan
Corp., 76 which held that state security for expenses provisions were
applicable in federal court because they are substantive rather than
procedural in nature.
Piccard v. Sperry Corp., 36 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y.), affl'd, 120 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1941);
Lissauer v. Bertles, 37 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Summers v. Hearst, 23 F. Supp. 986
(S.D.N.Y. 1938).
168. Arguments that the contemporaneous ownership rule is substantive can be made.
See 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACcE 23.1.15[2] (2d ed. 1978); 7A C. WRmGrr & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1829 (1972); Harbrecht, supra note 123, at 1046-50.
169. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
170. Id. at 471 (footnote omitted).
171. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
172. Id. at 556.
173. 354 F. Supp. 759 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
174. 341 F. Supp. 845 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
175. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
176. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
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While Cohen can be distinguished on the basis that its rationale
is rather strictly limited to security for expenses statutes, the Penn
Central court nonetheless may have reached the correct conclu-
sion.'77 As pointed out in Hanna v. Plumer, 7 forum-shopping is one
of the chief concerns of Erie and its progeny. It would appear that
failure to apply the stricter state requirement "would have so impor-
tant an effect upon the fortunes of one or both of the litigants that
. . . it would be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal
court."' 7 ' The Penn Central view also seems in harmony with the
Supreme Court's discussion in Angel v. Bullington'15 of a somewhat
analogous question involving a state door-closing statute. The Court
there stated:
The essence of diversity jurisdiction is that a federal court enforces State law
and State policy. If North Carolina has authoritatively announced that defi-
ciency judgments cannot be secured within its borders, it contradicts the pre-
suppositions of diversity jurisdiction for a federal court in that State to give
such a deficiency judgment. North Carolina would hardly allow defeat of a
State-wide policy through occasional suits in a federal court. What is more
important, diversity jurisdiction must follow State law and policy. A federal
court in North Carolina, when invoked on grounds of diversity of citizenship,
cannot give that which North Carolina has withheld."'
Whether this approach will be followed with respect to section
1002's requirement of devolution from a contemporaneous partner
remains to be seen. The problem almost certainly will arise if the
1976 Act receives widespread acceptance among the states.1
2
V. EXPENSES
Once again reverting to the Delaware and New York models,'3
the drafters of the 1976 Act expressly have provided for the recovery
by a successful derivative plaintiff of his or her expenses, including
attorney's fees. Section 1004 provides:
177. See Harbrecht, supra note 123, at 1050-52.
178. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
179. Id. at 468 n.9.
180. 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
181. Id. at 191-92.
182. Conflicts similar to those discussed in the text also may arise in state courts in
those states having a general rule of civil procedure broad enough to cover derivative suits
brought by limited partners. E.g., DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1; MAss. R. Civ. P. 23.1. In such
instances the conflict probably would be resolved in favor of § 1002 on the basis of the maxim
that specific provisions control over more general ones. The potential for such conflicts,
however, may influence state legislatures to modify § 1002 so that it will conform to their
various individual general rules of procedure.




If a derivative action is successful, in whole or in part, or if anything is
received by the plaintiff as a result of a judgment, compromise, or settlement
of an action or claim, the court may award the plaintiff reasonable expenses,
including reasonable attorney's fees, and shall direct him to remit to the lim-
ited partnership the remainder of those proceeds received by him.18'
The final clause of section 1004 indicates that the primary
source for payment of the plaintiff's expenses is the fund, if any, he
or she has recovered on behalf of the limited partnership. This pro-
cedure is in accord with the practice in shareholders' derivative suits
and finds theoretical justification in the nature of a derivative ac-
tion. Since the cause of action asserted belongs to the limited part-
nership, and since its successful prosecution presumably benefits
the partnership, it is thought fair to impose on the partnership the
burden of paying the expenses connected with the suit."5 The pract-
ical justification for imposition of this burden is that it encourages
litigation of meritorious claims by limited partners whose personal
stake in the outcome necessarily is indirect and often will be small
compared to the costs involved.'86
It should be noted that the award of attorneys' fees and other
expenses is discretionary and is limited to amounts that the court
determines to be reasonable. These limitations apparently stem
from a competing concern that a provision permitting payment of
the plaintiff's litigation expenses may encourage the pressing of
specious as well as meritorious claims.8 7 Because section 1004 en-
compasses dispositions by way of settlement or compromise as well
as by judgment, this concern may be justified.' s
In determining a reasonable fee for the plaintiff's attorney,
courts will have the benefit of a substantial amount of corporate
precedent. A number of factors are considered relevant, including:
"(1) the amount recovered for the corporation; (2) the time fairly
required to be spent on the case; (3) the skill with which the services
were performed; (4) the novelty and complexity of the issues; (5) the
standing of the attorneys; and (6) the contingent nature of the
fee."' 8 Although it has been stated that the amount recovered is the
184. 1976 Act § 1004.
185. See 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcICE 23.1.25, at 23.1-143 to -144 (2d ed. 1978).
186. See 7A C. WmGoHT & A. MILLER, supra note 168, § 1841 at 443.
187. See 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACrsc 23.1.25, at 23.1-146 (2d ed. 1978).
188. For a discussion of the compromise or settlement of derivative suits under the 1976
Act, see text accompanying notes 200-11 infra.
189. Newman v. Stein, 58 F.R.D. 540, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); accord, Ramey v. Cincin-
nati Enquirer, Inc., 508 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1048 (1975); Angoff




most important of these factors, 0 and while some older cases seem
to restrict the awarding of plaintiff's expenses to situations in which
the litigation has produced a fund against which they may be
taxed,"' the modern trend is to allow such expenses whenever the
litigation has substantially benefitted the corporation." The theory
of these cases is that because successful vindication of a corporate
right benefits all shareholders, all ought to share in the expense. If
the suit has not resulted in the creation of a fund, this cost-
spreading may be accomplished by an order directing the corpora-
tion to pay the plaintiff's reasonable expenses."' Section 1004, by
disjunctively referring to success or receipt of funds by the plaintiff,
not only seems to permit but also to contemplate similar holdings
in limited partners' derivative suits.
It also seems clear from section 1004's reference to compromises
and settlements that the suit need not proceed to final judgment.
This provision furthers the policy favoring resolution of disputes by
settlement and is in accord with current corporate law."' Section
1004, however, may go farther. Its use of the terminology
"compromise or settlement of an action or claim" may indicate an
intent to adopt the rule of Dottenheim v. Emerson Electric Manu-
facturing Co. ,"5 that if the requisite corporate or partnership benefit
is present, it is not even necessary for the plaintiff formally to have
commenced the derivative action.' 6
Finally, after giving the court discretion to award a successful
plaintiff his or her reasonable expenses and attorney's fees, section
1004 instructs the court to direct him or her to remit the remainder
of the proceeds, if any, to the limited partnership."7 At first glance,
this mandate does not seem remarkable. Since the underlying cause
of action was that of the limited partnership, the balance of any
proceeds received ordinarily should redound to its benefit. In some
situations, however, strict adherence to the concept of the limited
190. Newman v. Stein, 58 F.R.D. 540, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
191. See Giesecke v. Pittsburgh Hotels, Inc., 180 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1950); Wolfes v.
Paragon Refining Co., 74 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1934).
192. E.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Ramey v. Cincinnati
Enquirer, Inc., 508 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1048 (1975).
193. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392-97 (1970).
194. E.g., Green v. Transitron Elec. Corp., 326 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1964); Republic Nat'l
Life Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 73 F.R.D. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Milstein v. Wemer, 58 F.R.D. 544
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
195. 77 F. Supp. 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1948).
196. The corresponding provisions of the Delaware and New York statutes contain
similar language. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1732(d) (1974); N.Y. PARTNEaSmP LAW § 115-a(5)
(McKinney Supp. 1978-1979).
197. 1976 Act § 1004.
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partnership as injured party may prove inefficient or even unjust.
For example, if a general partner flagrantly misappropriates part-
nership assets, remains in control, and is likely to continue this
conduct in the future, a direct pro rata recovery by the limited
partners may be preferable to placing the proceeds of the derivative
suit in jeopardy by remitting them to the partnership. Individual
pro rata recovery on a derivative cause of action, while exceptional,
is not unknown in the corporate sphere."'s The Delaware and New
York counterparts of section 1004 make specific provision for such
a possibility, 9' and perhaps it would have been wiser for the drafters
of the 1976 Act to have modified their mandate in a similar fashion.
VI. JUDICIAL SUPERVISION OF SETrLEMENTS
The final sentence of Rule 23.1 states that a derivative suit
"shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be
given to shareholders or members in such manner as the court di-
rects." 100 This provision, the substance of which has been adopted
by statute or court rule in a number of states,2"' contains two sepa-
rate requirements-judicial supervision of the dismissal or compro-
mise of a derivative suit; and notice to other shareholders or mem-
bers.
The requirement of judicial supervision serves two related pur-
poses. First, it is designed to prevent the settlement of a meritorious
claim by an out-of-court payment to the plaintiff and his or her
attorney to the exclusion of the corporation and other shareholders.
Second, it is intended to discourage institution of a vexatious or
"strike" suit in hope of such a paynient.10 The notice requirement
not only gives other shareholders whose interests may be affected
the opportunity to be heard, but in so doing, gives the court a
broader perspective regarding the merits of the proposed settle-
ment.
203
198. See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952
(1955); Grenier, Prorata Recovery by Shareholders on Corporate Causes of Action as a Means
of Achieving Corporate Justice, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 165 (1962).
199. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1732(d) (1974): "This subsection shall not apply to any
judgment rendered for the benefit of injured limited partners only and limited to a recovery
of the loss or damage sustained by them." N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 115-a(5) (McKinney
Supp. 1978-1979) is similar.
200. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
201. E.g., COLO. R. Civ. P. 23.1; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1; MAsS. R. Civ. P. 23.1; N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAw § 626(d) (McKinney 1963).
202. 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.1.24[1] (2d ed. 1978); 7A C. WRIGHT & A.
MILTER, supra note 168, § 1839 at 427-28.
203. Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 778 (1944).
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Although New York has enacted similar requirements specifi-
cally with respect to limited partners' derivative suits, Delaware has
not.211 The drafters of the 1976 Act, following Delaware's lead, have
omitted any direct requirement of judicial supervision of a compro-
mise or settlement with notice to the other partners. The primary
policy justification for such an omission appears to be that fairness
may require the plaintiff to be free to settle a derivative action
because if it ultimately is unsuccessful he or she personally must
pay the costs of the litigation. 2 5 On the other hand, in light of the
strong policy considerations supporting judicial supervision and
notice, denial of the right to settle out of court may not be too great
a burden for plaintiffs to bear.2 6 This seems particularly true in view
of the absence of any requirement in the 1976 Act that the plaintiff
fairly and adequately represent the interests of other partners simi-
larly situated.07
As a practical matter, it may be that most settlements of lim-
ited partners' derivative suits will be judicially supervised."os Two
reasons support this conclusion. First, defendants usually will wish
to be free of the threat of future suits by thepartnership or by other
limited partners on the same cause of action. Unless the statute of
limitations is about to run, they can achieve this goal only through
the res judicata effect of a court-approved settlement.2°9 Addition-
ally, the plaintiff's motive for an out-of-court settlement that
amounts to a private payoff is undercut substantially by section
1004's requirement that the remainder of any proceeds received by
him or her be remitted to the partnership.210 In light of this explicit
statutory directive, a plaintiff clearly would be accountable to the
partnership for the amount received by him or her in an out-of-court
settlement, provided that the facts of the suit and its settlement
were known to the other limited partners.'
VII. CONCLUSION
Commercially, the limited partnership has come of age. Recog-
204. See N.Y. PARTsERsmP LAW § 115-a(4) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979); Rodgers v.
Sound of Music Co., 74 Misc. 2d 699, 343 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1972); see also DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 1732 (1974).
205. 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.1.2412], at 23.1-136 (2d ed. 1978).
206. See id.
207. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
208. It has been stated that the court having jurisdiction in a derivative action has
inherent power to provide for the conduct of the proceedings, including the power to require
that notice be given to absent shareholders or members. Id., Advisory Committee Note.
209. H. HENN, supra note 121, at §§ 374, 376.
210. 1976 Act § 1004.
211. See Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1947).
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nizing this, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws promulgated the 1976 Act "to modernize the prior uni-
form law." ' Of the sixty-four separate sections contained in the
1976 Act the four relating to limited partners' derivative suits ulti-
mately may prove to be the most significant. The law relating to
these actions is of critical importance to limited partners but, with
the exceptions of Delaware and New York, it presently is developing
in only a few jurisdictions and on a slow, sporadic, case-by-case
basis. Sections 1001 through 1004 are designed to remedy this situa-
tion by providing a comprehensive set of rules governing the initia-
tion and conduct of derivative suits by limited partners. This is no
small accomplishment, and any criticism of the fine-tuning of these
rules should not obscure this basic fact.
Some, if not all of these sections, of course, present problems
of construction that will require resolution by the courts. Perhaps
the thorniest of these lurk in the contemporaneous membership rule
of section 1002. Ambiguous drafting coupled with an uncertain pol-
icy basis for the rule and its two exceptions create a situation in
which both nonuniform interpretation and collision with Rule 23.1
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are possible. In addition, in
a comprehensive scheme governing derivative suits one would ex-
pect to find a section that explicitly reflects the modern trend re-
quiring judicial supervision of compromises and settlements with
provision for adequate notice to the other limited partners. The 1976
Act regrettably addresses this issue only indirectly in section 1004.
Nevertheless, the simple recognition of the right of a limited partner
to sue derivatively is such an important contribution to limited
partnership law that it far outweighs these and other shortcomings
in the mechanics controlling exercise of the right.
212. 1976 Act, Prefatory Note.
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